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Abstract—As cloud computing becomes prevalent in recent
years, more and more enterprises and individuals outsource
their data to cloud servers. To avoid privacy leaks, outsourced
data usually is encrypted before being sent to cloud servers,
which disables traditional search schemes for plain text. To
meet both end of security and searchability, search-supported
encryption is proposed. However, many previous schemes suffer
severe vulnerability when typos and semantic diversity exist in
query requests. To overcome such flaw, higher error-tolerance is
always expected for search-supported encryption design, some-
times defined as ’fuzzy search’. In this paper, we propose a
new scheme of multi-keyword fuzzy search over encrypted and
outsourced data. Our approach introduces a new mechanism to
map a natural language expression into a word-vector space.
Compared with previous approaches, our design shows higher
robustness when multiple kinds of typos are involved. Besides,
our approach is enhanced with novel data structures to improve
search efficiency. These two innovations can work well for both
accuracy and efficiency. Moreover, these designs will not hurt
the fundamental security. Experiments on a real-world dataset
demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach, which
outperforms currently popular approaches focusing on similar
tasks.
Index Terms—Searchable encryption; Cloud computing; Fuzzy
search
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the age of “Big Data” and mobile Internet, the volumeof data produced and processed through Internet expands
fiercely. It brings a higher demand for storage and computation
capacity. Since personal devices are incapable of handling
it on many occasions, cloud service is endowed with more
importance [1]–[3]. Meanwhile, cloud storage and computing
bring new concern on privacy protection [4], [5].
To protect data privacy, outsourced data is usually encrypted
in advance by data owners, after which the data query and
search are performed. However, conventional search meth-
ods cannot be implemented in the ciphertext. Thus, search-
supported encryption is proposed [6], with which relevance
degree among encrypted text can be measured and thus
search over encrypted data becomes possible. Furthermore,
considering ambiguity, typos, grammar variance, and semantic
variety, bias is common for text matching. Fuzzy search is thus
proposed [7]–[9] to achieve more robust search performance
with these noises involved (e.g. misspelling detection feature
of search engines). Facing the same demand, fuzzy search is
also developed on encrypted data. As usual scenes of data
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search, users care most about the accuracy and efficiency of
searching. With a metric, there should be a ground truth rank
between stored files and input query by their similarity. Corre-
spondingly, a higher accuracy for search over encrypted data
asks that the set of returned files should share a larger overlap
with the ground truth most similar files. Efficiency is reflected
by the time latency during search and obviously depends on
the search algorithm performance. In this paper, we propose
a novel multi-keyword fuzzy search design over encrypted
cloud data. We promote performance on both accuracy and
time efficiency with different innovations.
We conclude the pipeline of searchable encryption ap-
proaches into three steps as follows:
1) Represent: Keywords are extracted from outsourced files
or received queries, and transfer into word-vectors, a
combination of which builds the final representation of
files or queries.
2) Encrypt and index: Files and queries are both encrypted
to enhance security. They are suggested to be encrypted
in heterogeneous ways. The encryption algorithm and key
are usually provided by data owners. With some data
structure, encrypted files are organized and stored for
indexing.
3) Search: In practice, data users send queries and data
holders perform some search algorithms on the query and
stored encrypted data. Search consists of the calculation
of relevance score and ranking by the score. The data
user usually only asks for the top-k most relevant files
with the query instead of all relevant files.
The first step is critical when designing a fuzzy search
mechanism. By representing files in a certain structure, key-
word information within files is mapped into a uniform
representation space. Similar files, mostly containing a close
composition of keywords, are expected to be mapped close
in this space. The representation should be error-tolerant for
common language bias, such as typos and synonyms, to return
users’ desired results. On the other hand, the search index,
encryption techniques, and search algorithms should cooperate
well to conduct fast and correct retrieval.
Even though, promising search accuracy is achieved by
current fuzzy search schemes on some occasions, it may
fail in many others. Typos, grammatical bias, semantic diver-
sity often bring troubles. Non-perfect representation schemes
even create new troubles. For example, anagrams (different
words consisting of the same set of letters) will puzzle some
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2schemes [8] to map different keywords into the same location
in the representation space. To overcome similar flaws and
promote search accuracy, we propose a novel text presentation
scheme that generating keyword-vectors based on designed
’order-preserved uni-gram’ (OPU). OPU outperforms popu-
lar ’uni-gram’ [8] of ’n-gram’ [9] in term of accuracy in
many cases. The keyword pair ’silent’/’listen’ (anagram) or
’keep’/’keap’(typo) has no chance to confuse our proposed
mechanism as it can do in some other cases.
Because efficiency is another major concern during data
search, accelerating search on without too much harm to
accuracy is expected. We also propose an improvement on
this aspect by renewing the design of data structure and
search algorithm. Precisely, we propose an improved data
organization scheme and design search algorithm based on it.
A novel data clustering method is designed to gather similar
files within a cluster. These clusters are some continuous areas
in the aforementioned representation space. Furthermore, an
index tree is built in a hierarchical manner by organizing
those file clusters. Namely, we design a hierarchical index
tree (HIT) for data organization. Compared with the previous
designs [10]–[13], this design is expected to achieve better
time efficiency with little harm to accuracy. Moreover, it is
flexible enough to adapt to different cases with less hand-
adjusted parameters. Moreover, such tree-based data organi-
zation brings extra convenience to do verification [14], [15]
after data retrieval to ensure the freshness, correctness, and
completeness of returned data.
At last and most importantly, security and privacy should
be guaranteed in our proposed architecture, which is expected
to be ensured under different popular threat models [16].
Therefore, focusing on the problem of fuzzy multi-keyword
search over encrypted data, we summarize our contributions
proposed in this paper in term of two aspects:
• We improve accuracy under many cases by designing a
novel file representation scheme named ’order-preserved
uni-gram’ (OPU). It maps similar text to be close in
representation space with kinds of noise involved.
• We improve the search efficiency by designing a new data
structure for data organization and corresponding search
algorithms. Hierarchical index tree (HIT) is adopted in
our scheme to improve time efficiency during query with
slight harm to accuracy. To organize outsourced data,
an improved dynamic clustering algorithm is proposed
which needs less pre-set parameters and thus more flex-
ible.
These two innovations are involved in different stages of
search on encrypted data and contribute to the final proposal
differently. Of course, our proposal faces the trade-off between
time efficiency and search accuracy: OPU brings slightly
more computation overhead during the file processing and
indexing stage than the word parsing based on naive “uni-
gram”; construction of HIT brings slight negative effect on the
search accuracy as well. However, both of the degradations are
trivial enough that the overall design benefits both accuracy
and time efficiency. We design various experiment to compare
our proposed approach; with state-of-the-art schemes [8] on
real-world linguistic dataset [17] and the result proves the
effectiveness of our approach.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Searchable Encryption
Curtmola et al. [18] proposed a security definition on
searchable encryption which is followed by most popular
mechanisms. Song et al. [19] proposed the first practical
searchable encryption mechanism. Previous work focused on
improving search accuracy and efficiency without harm to
a necessary security guarantee. Wang et al. [20] made an
important improvement by introducing novel file indexing
techniques. Cao et al. [21] proposed a novel encrypted search
scheme supporting multi-keyword matching by coordinate
matching. Focusing on reaching similar demand, conjunctive
keyword search [22], vector-space-based search models [23]
and many other works were proposed. Many aforementioned
studies focused on finding a higher efficient file representation
design. To the end of encryption, “Secure kNN” algorithm [24]
is adopted in most currently popular approaches [8], [20], [24],
[25].
B. Quicker search
It is costly to traverse the whole content of all files to
calculate their similarity with the query. To tackle the problem
of quicker comparison on large-scale file storage, file indexing
technique usually is adopted. As the first step, a file is
represented by extracted keywords from it, which compresses
the indexing volume to a great extent. Then it is common
to use some data structures to organize these compressed file
indices, on which previous encrypted search schemes propose
many innovations. Linear search by a single thread on indices
always provides the lower bound of time efficiency because
all files are traversed. As an improvement, some studies [26],
[27] try to improve latency through parallel computation and
multi-task distribution. Some others focus on the improvement
of the data structure for file indexing: hashing [13] and
tree-like data structure [10]–[12] are widely researched for
this topic. Recently, Chen et al. [28] introduced Hierarchical
Clustering mechanism into encryption data organization and
search algorithm. It is unavoidable in most cases that efficiency
improvement from novel data structure brings harm to search
accuracy because some files are skipped during the search to
save time. To improve time efficiency without too much harm
to accuracy is also expected in this area.
C. Fuzzy Search
Language bias such as misspellings and multiple-semantic
expression is common and ought to be recognized to improve
search accuracy. However, it is hard to distinguish many
confusing pairs of words to be typos or different words. For
example, how an automated system recognizes that received
“catts eat mice” is a typo of “cats eat mice” and search
for stored data relevant to the latter and wanted expression?
Furthermore, encryption makes it even much more difficult
3because a slight difference in original natural language ex-
pression could be heavily zoomed out after encryption. When
calculating the similarity of different text, these recognized
bias declines the search accuracy. To enhance the robustness
for search, it comes to the issue of “fuzzy search” topic.
Li et al. [7] first formalized and enabled the fuzzy search
over encrypted data while maintaining the security guarantee
with the help of a pre-defined fuzzy set. Under similar pre-
defined dataset, Fu et al. [29] improved search accuracy when
synonyms or antonyms exits in text. Without the assistance of
extra information, fuzzy search usually is designed based on
text representation and indexing schemes with high language-
bias-tolerance. Wang et al. [9] relieved the effect of typos
or grammatical diversity by transforming keywords into ’bi-
grams’. Furthermore, Fu et al. transform keywords into ’uni-
grams’ in [8] to achieve better performance. But word parsing
method based on ’uni-grams’ in [8] still have many defects
such as not enough robust when anagrams, special character
or some other kinds of language bias are involved in text
materials.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
As popular designs [7]–[9], [21], the system model our
scheme faces consists of three components: data owner, cloud
server and data user. Data owners encrypt files before out-
sourcing them and build a data structure to index these out-
sourced files. The file indices are also encrypted. Outsourced
data is only exposed to certified data users and trusted remote
servers. Certified data users encrypt their queries and send
them to remote servers. Search is operated on remote servers
to leverage its computation and storage capacity. Relevance
scores between queries and the stored data are computed with
some algorithms. Remote servers then return top − k most
relevant files to data users. Data users would decipher these
files with keys from the data owner.
Certified Data User Data Owner
Data Decryption Keys
Remote Server
Encrypted Top-k 
Files
Query Vector
Encrypted Files
Encrypted Index
Fig. 1: System Model with three parties
B. Locality-Sensitive Hashing (LSH)
As a subclass of hash functions, locality-sensitive hashing
functions have a significant feature. More similar items, which
can be determined with some distance metric d (e.g. Euclidean
distance), are more likely to be hashed into the same group. A
LSH familyH = {h1, h2, ..., hl} is defined as (r1, r2, p1, p2)−
sensitive if for each hq ∈ H(1≤q≤l), two arbitrarily chosen
points u,v satisfy:
if d(u, v) ≤ r1 : Pr[hq(u) = hq(v)] ≥ p1 (1a)
if d(u, v) ≥ r2 : Pr[hq(u) = hq(v)] ≤ p2 (1b)
where d(u, v) is the distance between these two points to
represent their similarity. p − stable LSH [30] is a specific
kind of LSH methods based on a p− stable function family,
which can be formulated as:
ha,b(
−→v ) = b
−→
R · −→v + b
a
c (2)
where
−→
R , −→v are two vectors and a and b ∈ [0, a] are two real
numbers.
−→
R , a and b are parameters and −→v is the variable to
be hashed.
C. Bloom Filter
Bloom Filter [31] is a special data structure widely adopted
to map a high-dimensional point into a space of lower
dimensions. A D-dimensional point is transformed into a
one-hot m-bit vector with a hash function. With a set of l
independent hash functions H = {h1, h2, ..., hl}, the point
can be thus transformed into a m-bit vector with at most
l nonzero bits. With the features of LSH , more similar
keywords are expected to be mapped into the same position
with higher probability by the same LSH function. Thus the
finally generalized vectors are more likely to be similar or
even the same. For a given set of points P = {p1, p2, ..., pn},
the l independent LSH functions encode each pi(1 ≤ i ≤ n)
into at most different l bits of a m-bit vector BFP . This
vector is thus called ’Bloom Filter’. To judge whether a point
p ∈ P , we simply generalize its corresponding bloom filter
the same set of hash functions and test whether there is the
same bloom filter for pi found. As proved in [31], the chance
to give a false positive through this method is approximately
(1−e− l×nm )l. The minimal rate of false positive is ( 12 )l, which
is achieved when n×l = m×ln 2. Thus a better expected false
positive is available with bigger l. But to set l small can keep
produced Bloom Filter sparse, which is helpful to increase the
accuracy of our scheme. This raises an important trade-off for
application of bloom filters.
D. Hierarchical Clustering Tree
Clustering algorithms are adopted to divide items into differ-
ent clusters through comparing their similarity, namely items
are divided into the same cluster if they are adjacent enough
in the vector space. Popular hierarchical clustering techniques,
such as k-means [32], DBSCAN [33] and GMM [34], are
widely adopted in data mining. Hierarchical clustering in [28]
sets a maximum number of elements in a cluster and then
begins with random sample points to divide adjacent items
into one cluster. For data organization in search cases, the
element to be clustered can be a file or a query or the center
point of a sub-cluster, all of which are first mapped to a
4keyword
root word
‘added’
‘add’
stemming
keyword transformation
(1, 0, 0, 0.5, … , 0.5, 0, 0, 1, … , 0, 0, 0, 1, …)uni-gram vector
(in ‘Uni-gram Space’)
0 1 0 01 0 1… 0… 0 … …Bloom Filter(in ‘Filter Space’)
Fig. 2: Transformation from keyword to Bloom Filter
uniform space and represented by a point in the space. In
hierarchical clustering, the clustering algorithm is performed
recursively on original elements and the points representing
sub-clusters. Finally, we could generalize a hierarchical clus-
tering tree. Specifically, each outsourced file is a leaf node of
the hierarchical clustering tree built through. To search on the
tree to find some nodes, the general time complexity is simply
O(log(n)) instead of O(n) for linear search.
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHMS
In this section, we introduce our proposed algorithms in
detail. Our main innovations include a novel keyword trans-
formation scheme and a specially designed data structure
for indexing. The former is named ’order-preserved uni-
gram’(OPU) to show its difference with traditional ’uni-gram’
[8] or ’n-gram’ [20]. The designed data structure is called
“Hierarchical Index Tree” (HIT). With the help of OPU,
more information of the original natural language keywords
can be reserved without privacy leaks, providing help for
more accurate search. On the other hand, we propose an
adaptive clustering algorithm to build HIT and a corresponding
search algorithm to better balance the trade-off between search
efficiency and accuracy.
A. “Order-Preserved Uni-gram” (OPU)
Misspelling occurs in three cases: ’misspelling of letters’,
’order of letters reversed’ and ’addition or missing of let-
ters’. To judge the similarity of two keywords, the popular
mechanism usually splits keywords into some “pieces”. The
granularity of which keywords are decomposed influence
the information it can memorize and the collision chance
that different keywords are transformed into similar or even
the same set of pieces. Wang et al. [9] adopted the ’n-
gram’ method, which would split the word ’task’ into the set
{ta, as, sk} when n = 2. This method achieves a good result
for the first case but fails for another two cases. Based on
this scheme, Fu et al. [8] proposed ’uni-gram’ method, under
which, for instance, the uni-gram set of keyword ’scheme’ is
{s1, c1, h1, e1,m1, e2}. This scheme performs better for the
other two cases. However, due to the lack of information on
the order of letters, such a scheme is incapable of recognizing
’anagram’, such as ’devil’ and ’lived’.
To bring better fuzzy search, we propose a new method
to transform a keyword into an ’order-preserved uni-gram’
vector, which would show advantages compared with previous
work. While keywords are of different length, the output OPU
vectors are expected to be equally long. The construction of
an OPU vector can be divided into three steps, decompose,
encode and infect, introduced as follows:
1) Decompose: Given a set of keywords extracted from
some text materials, we perform this operation on each of them
respectively. First, all keywords should be stemmed [35] to
eliminate the grammatical and other linguistic variations. Then
all keywords would be dismembered into single letters. But
different from the unordered set of letters for ’uni-gram’, we
also record the position of each letter in the original keyword
for further use.
2) Encode: To relieve computation and storage overheads,
at most first u letters in a keyword can be fully represented
after transformation. The corresponding length of output
OPU vector, VKW , should be (u × 26 + 30), all bits of
which are binary. Specifically, the vector consists of u “letter
blocks”(LB), each of which has 26 bits, and one ’digit and
symbol block’(DSB), whose length is 30 bits. Letters between
’a’ to ’z’ are mapped to 1st − 26th bit in each letter block.
The ith letter in KW corresponds to ith letter block in VKW .
For example, if the target keyword is “add”, only VKW [1],
VKW [26+4] and VKW [26×2+4] are set to 1 with all other bits
remaining 0 (because “a” and “d” are respectively the first and
the fourth letter in alphabet). The last 30 bits in VKW indicate
whether 10 digits (’0’-’9’) and 20 widely used symbols appear
in KW . In practice, if a keyword is too long to fit the preset
length of an OPU vector, it will be cast. As a trade-off, a
longer vector can represent more complicated keywords but
brings more overhead. On the other hand, a too short vector
would make information loss normal, which brings severe hurt
to representation rationality.
After encoding, we have vectors of uniform length repre-
senting keywords. The position of each letter in the original
keyword is encoded in these vectors, making a critical differ-
ence with traditional methods.
3) Infect: A simple insight to realize fuzzy search is to raise
the tolerance for letter dislocation when transforming words
to a standardized representation (such as the uni-gram vector
adopted in our scheme). To the tolerance of the produced uni-
gram vector, we propose an ’Infect’ mechanism, which makes
the most difference between our proposed method and previ-
ous methods. Each nonzero bit of the vector after “Encode”
would share its weights with neighboring bits and the relation
is determined by an Infection Function. After Infection, bits
of original representation vector may be transformed from
binary to float. A typical kind of Infection Functions can be
formulated as:
δw(d) =
{
1
sd/26
d ≤ 26u, d%26 = 0
0 otherwise
(3)
where d is the bit distance between two bits, s is a factor
to adjust the infection strength. Note u is another to adjust
how far the infection can spread and the farthermost distance
5is dmax = 26u. Because same letters on the neighboring
position of the original keyword are mapped into two 26-bit-
far-away bits, only when d%26 = 0, infection happens. Such
a mechanism would weaken the negative effect brought by
letter dislocation.
To explain that in detail, we study it with an example.
A keyword “add” is already encoded into a OPU vector
after “Decompose” and “Encode”. If we set s = 2 and
u = 2, Infection happens: VKW [1], VKW [30] and VKW [56]
are 1, others being 0. In the first wave of infection, value
of VKW [27], VKW [4], VKW [56], VKW [30] and VKW [82] in-
creases by δw = 121 = 0.5. Then the second wave of
infection follows: VKW [53], VKW [82], VKW [4] and VKW [108]
are further increased by δw = 122 = 0.25. So far, infection
finishes because s = 2. Finally the OPU vector generalized
from the keyword “add” becomes V ′KW with u = 2:
V ′KW [i] =

1.5 i = 30, 56
1 i = 1
0.75 i = 4, 82
0.5 i = 27
0.25 i = 53, 108
0 otherwise
(4)
4) Analysis of Order-preserved Unigram (OPU): We ana-
lyze the improvement of the proposed OPU over previous ’bi-
gram’ [9] and ’uni-gram’ [8] design in this part. Comparison
is performed through examples with different requirements for
fuzzy search taken into consideration. The similarity of two
keywords is simply quantified in Euclidean distance as:
Dist[V1][V2] =
√√√√ N∑
i=1
(V1[i]− V2[i])2, (5)
where V1 and V2 are respectively the representation vector of
two keywords. N is the length of vectors. In fuzzy search, we
want simple typo brings no severe decrease to similarity score.
In other words, if V1 is the correct form of a keyword and V2 is
a corresponding fuzzy form, their distance should be as short
as possible so that they are considered to be largely similar
during a search. On the other hand, if V1 and V2 are different
wanted keywords and they are similar under some metric, a
robust representation design can still distinguish them after
vector representation. For instance, “add” and “dad” are not
expected to be thought “similar” or even “the same” under a
good scheme, which may bring huge bias into search results.
Considering various requirements for fuzzy search, three
types of misspellings cases should be taken into consideration:
a) Letter misspelling: Letter misspelling indicates when
letters in a word are replaced by some incorrect ones. For
example, “beer” can be misspelled as “berr”.
b) Wrong letter order: Wrong order of letters indicates
when words are consist of a uniform set of letters, but some
letters in them are arranged with the wrong order. For example,
the word “bere” may be typed as “beer” for wrong letter order.
Fuzzy type Correct Wrong Bi-
gram
Uni-
gram
OPU
Misspelling
add aad 2 2
√
3.125
bear beer 2 2
√
3.25
Wrong Order
used uesd
√
6 0
√
1.75
pear paer 4 0 1
Insertion/Absence
pen pn
√
3 1
√
3.25
pen pean
√
3 1
√
2.75
TABLE I: The comparison of similarity scores under different
schemes. The similarity is represented by Euclidean distance
and parameters for OPU are set as: u = 2 and s = 2.
c) Insertion/Absence of letter: Insertion or absence of
letter(s) in a word occurs frequently as well, causing typos in
the text. For example, the word “pen” may be misspelled to
be “pean” or “pn” in this case.
An ideal keyword decomposing approach should recognize
the high similarity between a word and its typos. On the other
hand, as an obvious trade-off, when a typo suffers from the
severe difference from the correct form, the similarity should
no longer be high, or the approach would become invalid to
distinguish some different but similar words. For the three
listed fuzzy cases, we calculate the relevance scores under
different word decomposing approaches. The results are shown
with examples in TABLE I.
Except for the three basic types of misspellings, OPU
handles many other cases better than ’uni-gram’ and ’bi-gram’.
The most obvious shortcoming of traditional ’uni-gram’ is
that only the composition of letters in a word is recorded
after decomposing, the information of their position is lost
totally. Such a shortcoming makes it unable to distinguish
different words in many cases. For example, for the traditional
’uni-gram’ mechanism, anagrams like “listen” and “silent”
produce the same keyword vector after transformation, which
is incapable of satisfying users’ demand. For example, it is
apparently unacceptable to regard “Dad is silent” and “Dad
is listen” as the same queries. While in our proposed OPU,
the position information is also encoded into the final word
representation, thus anagrams could no longer compromise our
approach.
In summary, based on ’uni-gram’, our proposed OPU not
only inherits all its advantage but also encodes the position
of letters in the original word into final representation, which
enhances our scheme in many cases. We qualitatively com-
pare the ability of three mentioned mechanisms to show the
difference between different words in different cases and the
result is shown in TABLE II. Note that “Ex-1” concludes the
case with non-alphabet involved in a string.
B. “Hierarchical Index Tree” (HIT)
As the other main contribution, we exploit an efficient data
structure to organize the file indices. Instead of the most naive
linear organization, we design a tree-based index organization.
To be precise, we build a hierarchical index tree to organize
the file indices for faster file search. To relieve computation
6Keyword #1 Keyword #2 bi-gram uni-gram OPU
listen silent Yes No Yes
2case case2 No No Yes
exams exam Yes Yes Yes
running run No Yes Yes
useful use No Yes Yes
Ex-1 Ex-1 No Yes Yes
TABLE II: Comparison among three schemes
C1
C3 C4
C7 C9 C10 C11
F1 F3 F4 F5
C8
F2
C2
C5 C6
C12 C13 C14 C15
F6 F7 F8 F9
ROOT
Fig. 3: Overview of Hierarchical Index Tree
overhead, we do not index a file straightforward through its
full keyword vector, which usually is of high dimension.
Instead, we map original word vectors into some intermediate
representation of lower dimension and then perform indexing
on it. As mentioned before, we choose “bloom filter” as the
intermediate representation.
1) Construction of HIT: Given the file representation vec-
tors, each of which encodes the keyword information of a
file, we propose HIT to organize them. To build HIT, we
need to divide bloom filters into clusters. Some nearby clusters
may form a larger cluster standing on a higher layer in HIT.
We propose an improved dynamic K-means Algorithm to
plan these clusters of different levels, through linking which
we could build the final HIT. We explain the algorithm in
Algorithm 1. Instead of giving a fixed tightness factor to
determine the final cluster number, we compare the average
point distance and minimum point distance in a cluster to
determine whether this cluster should be further subdivided.
To generalize clusters of higher level, the clusters of lower-
level are represented by their center coordinates and thus
regarded as “points”. Algorithm 1 is therefore capable of
clustering some tiny clusters into a larger one. Such operation
is kept performing until a final cluster containing all points is
generalized, and the construction of HIT is done.
2) Search in HIT: To search files in HIT, we need to cal-
culate the relevance score between the representation vectors
in HIT nodes and a given query vector, which usually is
generalized from a query string. Only the leaf nodes in HIT
represent real files and search process is expected to return
k most similar stored files. To increase time efficiency, an
intelligent search algorithm should not calculate the relevance
score of every leaf between the target vector. Therefore,
Algorithm 1 HIT Construction
Input:
1. P = {P1, P2, .., Pm}: the set of points to be clustered
2. e: a factor to adjust the desired tightness of clusters
3. D: function to calculate the distance of two points in P
Output:
1. C = {C1, C2, ..., Cn}: coordinates of built cluster centers
2. L = {L1, L2, ..., Lm}: cluster index of each point
1: n← 1
2: Stable← False
3: while not Stable do
4: Divide P into n clusters through K-means method
5: Update C and L
6: Stable← True
7: for Ci in C do
8: Calculate the distance matrix:Miuv = D(Pu, Pv),
where Pu, Pv ∈ Ci
9: Ravg ← the average distance in M i
10: Rmin ← the minimum distance in M i
11: if Rmin < eRavg then
12: n← n+ 1
13: Stable← False
return C and L
how to find reliable top-k most similar files without too
much computation is the core problem. We thus design a
search algorithm adapted to the HIT structure as explained in
Algorithm 2, which could be notated as Search(R, T, k,Rs).
Only to traverse all files can ensure that the literally “top-
k most relevant files” are always found. Linear traversing
requires a time complexity of O(n), where n is the scale of
stored files, which is unacceptable in most cases. Through the
proposed search algorithm, we try to find a proper trade-off
between search accuracy and time efficiency. In other words,
we look up required k files with O(logn) time complexity and
returned k files can be expected to be included in the global
“top-k most relevant files”. The designed experiment proves
that HIT improves time efficiency to a high extent without
bringing much damage on search accuracy.
V. ARCHITECTURE CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we explain the complete pipelines of our
proposed architecture in detail. Note that the scheme compre-
hensively leverages multiple algorithms and data structures in
different steps dependent on each other. However the general
architecture is still flexible with sub-modules replacement. For
example, replacing bloom filter with other data structure or
adopting a different encryption approach would not disable
the architecture but only change fine-grained operations. The
overview of the proposed architecture is visualized in Figure
4 in detail.
A. Keyword Extraction and Preprocessing
Given the set of files to be outsourced as F =
{F1, F2, ..., Fn}, the first step is to extract the keywords
from them. Preposition, pronoun, auxiliary words and other
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Fig. 4: Overview of the complete procedure of proposed scheme
Algorithm 2 Search in HIT
Input:
1. R: root node of current HIT
2. T : the representation vector of input query
3. k: the number of files to be returned
4. Rs(A,B): function of relevance score between A and B
Output:
F = {F1, ..., Fk}: found top-k similar files
1: while children of R are not leaves do
2: children nodes of R are C(R) = {C1, ..., Cp}
3: for i← 1 to p do
4: Si ← Rs(Ci, T )
5: find Sk ← max{Si|1 ≤ i ≤ p}
6: R← Ck
7: children of R are C(R) = {C1, ..., Cq}
8: S = {S1, ..., Sp} where Si = Rs(Ci, T )
9: R′ ← R
10: if k ≤ q then
11: C = {C ′1, ..., C ′k} ← points ranking top-k in S
12: F = {F1, ..., Fk}: files of C ′i(1 ≤ i ≤ k)
13: else
14: while |C(R′)| = 1 or |L(R′)| < k do
15: % L(R′) returns number of leaves under R′
16: R′ ← father of R′
17: F1 ← files corresponding to points in CR
18: F2 ← Search(R′, T, k − p,Rs)
19: F = F1 ∪ F2
return F
keywords without concrete semantic meaning are filtered
out. Remaining keywords are noted as K = {K1, ...,Kn},
where Ki is the set of keywords extracted from Fi. We have
∪ni=1Ki = {KW1, ...,KWN}. Then, we apply Stemming
Algorithm [36] on these keywords to eliminate grammatical
diversity. For example, “listening, “listen and “listened would
be all stemmed into a uniform keyword ’listen’. After stem-
ming, we then calculate the “term frequency” and “inverse
n=2
P1
P2 P3
P4
P5
P6
RP1&P4 < e × Ravg 
n=3
P1
P2 P3
P4
P5
P6
Fig. 5: Adjust cluster number in Algorithm 1
document frequency”(TF-IDF) [37] value of each keyword for
further use.
Considering there are in total N legal keywords, the TF
value of the ith keyword KWi, in the jth file Fj , is formulated
as:
TFi,j =
ni,j∑N
k=1 nk,j
, (6)
where ni,j is the frequency of KWi in Fj . The IDF value is
on the other calculated as:
IDFi =
|F|
|{Fk|KWi ∈ Fk}| (7)
The TF-IDF value of KWi in the file Fi is thus simply
calculated by:
TFIDFi,j = TFi,j × IDFi (8)
8B. Generalization of representation vectors of files
To relieve computation overheads, we would transform the
original keywords in natural language form into some numer-
ical representation. For computation and storage convenience,
they are in general transformed into vectors of uniform length.
Then we build a structured representation of each file based on
the representation vectors of all contained keywords in it. In
our proposed scheme, we follow two steps to reach the goal.
1) Keyword representation: To represent a keyword in a
uniform numerical form, we transform each keyword into
a corresponding OPU vector as introduced in the afore-
mentioned sections. Then, with l LSH functions, H =
{H1, H2, ...,Hl}, a keyword would be encoded into at most l
bits in a bloom filter with else bits all zero.
2) File representation: All keywords in a file haven been
represented already with bloom filter and the file can thus be
represented a set of keyword bloom filters. For example, for
a file Fi, we have BFFj = {bf1,j , ..., bfu,j} where bfk,j is
the bloom filter of the kth keyword in Fj . Furthermore, we
can represent the file in a bloom filter as well. The bloom
filter of a file is of the same length with that of keywords.
Through bit-wise addition and pre-calculated TF-IDF value of
each keyword, the final representation of Fj is formulated as:
bfFj =
u∑
k=1
TFIDFk,j × bfk,j (9)
Till now, we’ve got the final representation of files to be
outsourced. For queries, which would be involved in the
architecture in the search stage, we transform them into a
numerical representation as same as the process for files.
C. Construction of encrypted HIT
For search efficiency, we would outsource an aforemen-
tioned HIT for file indexing to the remote servers. Besides,
for privacy protection, we have to encrypt built HIT before
the outsourcing. In this section, we introduce the process to
build and encrypt the HIT.
1) Building HIT: Before this step, each file has been
represented in a bloom filter, which can also be regarded as
a point in a lb − dimensional space, where lb is the length
of adopted bloom filters. As introduced in the aforementioned
section and illustrated in Algorithm 1, we can build an HIT
to organize the indices of files now.
2) Encryption of HIT and query: To ensure security and
privacy, simply to transform data into bloom filters may be
inadequate because such a transformation is determinative.
Hence, we adopt secure kNN [19] algorithm to encrypt all
nodes in the HIT as well. On the other hand, a query will
also be encrypted in a corresponding manner to enable the
calculation of relevance between files and query. This process
is decomposed into steps as follows:
a) KeyGen(m): Given a security parameter m, this
method generates a security key SK, which is a tuple
(M1,M2, S). M1 and M2 are both m-dimensional invertible
matrices and S ∈ (0, 1)m is an m-dimensional vector.
b) EncIndex(I, SK): With secure kNN to encrypt an
index vector I , which should be a bloom filter in our scheme
and of length m, it should be first split into two vectors (I ′, I ′′)
as follows:
I ′[j] =
{
I[j], S[j] = 1
1
2 × I[j] + r, S[j] = 0
, 1 ≤ j ≤ m (10)
I ′′[j] =
{
I[j], S[j] = 1
1
2 × I[j]− r, S[j] = 0
, 1 ≤ j ≤ m (11)
where r is a small randomness introduced for security con-
sideration. Finally, the encrypted expression of I is TF =
{MT1 · I ′,MT2 · I ′′}.
c) EncQuery(Q,SK): For queries in the search stage,
it should also be encrypted to prevent information leak.
Following the previous steps, a query has also been represented
in an m-dimensional bloom filter, which is notated as Q. To
encrypt it into a trapdoor, symmetric operations are operated
to split it into two vectors (Q′, Q′′) as well:
Q′[j] =
{
Q[j], S[j] = 0
1
2 ×Q[j] + r, S[j] = 1
, 1 ≤ j ≤ m (12)
Q′′ =
{
Q[j], S[j] = 0
1
2 ×Q[j]− r, S[j] = 1
, 1 ≤ j ≤ m (13)
Finally the trapdoor of the query vector is expressed as:
TQ = {M−11 ·Q′,M−12 ·Q′′}
D. Search
While once all data encrypted, we need to re-introduce the
calculation of relevance score. Fortunately, secure kNN has a
great feature that it allows invariant relevance score through
naive inner production. Given an encrypted file index TF and
an encrypted query TQ, we can obtain their relevance score
as follows:
Rs(TF , TQ)
= TF · TQ
= {MT1 · I ′,MT2 · I ′′} · {M−11 ·Q′,M−12 ·Q′′}
= I ′ ·Q′ + I ′′ ·Q′′
=
m∑
j=1
(I ′[j] ·Q′[j] + I ′′[j] ·Q′′[j])
=
m∑
j=1,S[j]=0
(
1
2
I[j] + r) ·Q[j] + (1
2
I[j]− r) ·Q[j]
+
m∑
j=1,S[j]=1
(
1
2
Q[j] + r) · I[j] + (1
2
Q[j]− r) · I[j]
= I ·Q
(14)
Eq 14 proves that inner production on two vectors can pro-
duce the same result before and after the encryption by secure
9kNN. So far, we can search for the top-k most relevant files
through HIT referring to a given query. The required algorithm
has been introduced in previous sections and concluded in
Algorithm 2.
E. Verification
Similar as explained in [28], thanks to the construction
of HIT, returned files can be further verified to confirm
the correctness, completeness, and freshness. To support this
mechanism, the data owner needs to build a signed tree in
advance and outsource it to the cloud server together with
the index tree. Once the search finishes, the cloud server
returns top-k files together with the signed sub-tree along the
search path to the data user. For example, referring to Fig 3,
if files in C7, C8, C9, C10 are returned as search result, the
representation vectors stored in C1, C3, C4, C7, C8, C9, C10
would be all returned as well because these nodes are gone
through in search path. Here, we could adopt a signature
algorithm such as RSA [38] to generate this signed hash
tree. Then, with the received signed sub-tree, the data user
calculates the signature of each node with its corresponding
representation vector and compares the calculated signature
with the returned signature. The returned files pass the test,
and as claimed in [28], their correctness, completeness, and
freshness could be verified without considering the real-time
data update on remote servers.
VI. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we state the background settings and analysis
of the security promise of our proposed architecture theoret-
ically. The analysis is performed under two threat models,
where privacy leakage resulting from untrusted data use is out
of the discussion. The authorization of data users and remote
servers is also not in the scope of this section. We assume all
data users taken into consideration are already certified by the
data owner.
A. Threat Model
The cloud server is considered as honest-but-curious [39],
which means that it receives queries and executes the search
as commanded, but it tries to derive sensitive information
from queries and stored encrypted data at the same time. The
requirement of privacy in our scheme is as same as that defined
in [8], [9], [18]. Thus, there are two threat models asking for
different levels of privacy protection:
a) Known Ciphertext Model: In this threat model, the
cloud server is expected to gain only the content of encrypted
files, encrypted file index and encrypted trapdoor of received
queries.
b) Known Background Model: In this threat model, the
cloud server is also interested in the statistical background
information of encrypted data. It could perform a statistical
attack to obtain more information about keywords [21], [40]
involved in the search. Attach under this threat model also
reveals unencrypted information through collecting and infer-
ence.
B. Security Objectives
Because we adopt the encryption-before-outsourcing
schemes [6] in our proposed architecture, the privacy of file
content is already guaranteed unless adopted encryption is
broken. Then, there are other security objects that we need to
take into consideration:
a) Keyword Unvisiability: File index and trapdoor of
queries are both transformed from extracted keywords. The
real content keywords should also be protected from being
known by remote servers.
b) Trapdoor unlinkability: Remote servers should be pre-
vented from learning the content of query/files from repeated
search tasks. Thus, trapdoor generation from query/files should
be fully deterministic. Thus, the same query string or file
should not be always transformed into the same trapdoor.
We adopt bloom filter structure and secure kNN to ensure
security and privacy. Because the generalization of bloom
filters is deterministic with a certain family of LSH functions,
it cannot reach the requirement of ’Trapdoor unlinkability’.
However, during the encryption with secure kNN, randomness
is introduced into all trapdoors, which helps our scheme to be
capable of these security and privacy criteria. Detailed proof
can be simply borrowed from that provided in [19], [41].
VII. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
In this section, we design groups of experiments to estimate
the performance of our scheme. We use the real-world natural
language dataset ’20NewsGroups’ [17] as the raw plaintext
file source. Main programs are written in Python2.7. All
experiments were performed on a server having an ’Intel(R)
Xeon(R) CPU E5-2680 v4 @ 2.40GHz’ and 16GB available
DDR4 memory space. All experiments are run on Ubuntu
16.04 LTS operation system.
A. Evaluation Metrics
Since parameters setting matters a lot in experiments,
we specify it at first. Unless declared otherwise, involved
paramerts are set by default as:
• s = 2, u = 2 for “Infection” stage in generalizing OPU
• each query contains 5 keywords
• bloom filters have in total 8000 bits
• in total l = 20 LSH functions are used to build bloom
filters
• each query asks for 20 returned files
• e in Algorithm 1 is set to be 0.4
Each text file in the dataset ’20newsgroup’ has a set of key-
words whose scale varies a lot. To relieve the negative effect
brought by this bias, we first filter the dataset by referring to
how many keywords a file contains. We select 3583 files from
’20newsgroup’, each of which has at least 200 keywords and at
most 400 keywords. In total 41558 raw keywords are extracted
from these selected raw files. After stemming, keywords still
sum to more than 3000. Instead of simply setting a threshold
of relevance score to calculate search accuracy, we introduce
a more practical accuracy metric for evaluation, which named
overlap rate of top-k files. Because output return top-k files
10
affect what the data user gets from his query, this metric is
expected to be better estimated the search accuracy in data
users’ real experience. The accuracy under such metric is
formulated as:
Accuracy =
|{f |f ∈ FPk, f ∈ FEk}|
k
, (15)
where FPk is the set of top-k files returned through traversing
search on plaintext files, and FEk is the set of top-k files
returned through encrypted search. For instance, given the
same query, the search performed on encrypted data and
plaintext search return the same set of top-k files. Then
Accuracy reaches its upper limit, i.e., Accuracy = 1. When
k = 3, if the plaintext search returns a collection of files
FPk = {F1, F3, F5} and the search on encrypted data returns
FEk = {F1, F3, F6}, the accuracy should be 23 . We compare
our proposed scheme with the most popular scheme based on
“uni-gram” keyword decomposing [8].
B. Non-fuzzy Search
As a basic requirement, fuzzy search approaches should
definitely show convincing performance when no typo or
other misleading information is involved. We test the search
accuracy and time efficiency on text file datasets of different
volume. The experiment result is shown in Figure 6. The
search time for both of the schemes are tested under the naive
linear search for variable control.
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Fig. 6: Metrics under different volumes of dataset. a): accuracy
of returned result; b): time used to generalize dictionary from
raw dataset; c): time used to generalize bloomfilters of files;
d): average time consumed to perform a query
For the different volume of the dataset, our proposed scheme
achieves higher accuracy compared with Fu’s scheme [8]
with almost the same time performance. The main difference
between these two schemes is how to represent a keyword,
based on “uni-gram” of “order preserved uni-gram”. Hence,
the experiment proves that the introduction of OPU in our
proposed scheme does not bring obvious extra computation
overheads but it contributes to search accuracy to an evident
extent.
In practice, the number of returned files, k, ought to be
allowed fluctuant and adjusted by the data user. Therefore, a
robust search scheme should achieve steady search accuracy
when k changes. We control the value of k and maintain other
variables unchanged in the experiment for comparison. The
result is shown in Figure 7. Generally speaking, along with
the increase of k (return files for a query), search accuracy
increases and our scheme always achieves higher accuracy.
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Fig. 7: Accuracy with different numbers of returned files
(different values of k)
Similar to other searchable encryption mechanisms [8], [42],
[43] based on Bloom Filter [31], another critical trade-off be-
tween time efficiency and accuracy is the size of bloom filter.
A bigger bloom filter decreases the chance of hashing collision
but it obviously increases the computation and memory storage
overhead. To evaluate the influence of bloom filter size on our
scheme, we set another group of experiments and the result is
shown in Fig 8. Referring to the experiment, we find that our
proposed scheme performs better in the set range of bloom
filter size. The time efficiency is nearly the same as in that in
[8]. On the other hand, the increased length of bloom filter
brings no extra time consumption compared. It is because
that OPU introduces no extra computation overheads into the
bloom filter generalization stage.
At last, we also evaluate performance with different lengths
of queries. The result is reported in Fig 9. Our proposed
scheme performs steadily with different queries consisting of
1-10 keyword(s).
C. Fuzzy Search
During the generation of OPU, “Infection” is the most
important mechanism to support fuzzy search for many dif-
ferent occasions as described in previous sections. It is one
of the most important contributions in this paper. As the
core of this step, “Infection Function” adopted is adjusted by
two parameters: u and s in Eq 3. We change the value of
u and s independently to evaluate their influence on search
performance. The experiment result is reported in Fig 10,
where two misspelled keywords are inserted into each query
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Fig. 9: Search accuracy with different size of query string
(Lenquery)
string. The result argues that s has a very slight influence
on accuracy when varies from 2 to 5. However, when u is
set larger than 2, the accuracy reported in our scheme drops
aggressively.
We provide an intuitive explanation for this phenomenon: a
larger u allows the weight sharing between two more distant
positions in a keyword but in practice, data user misspells
keywords by exchanging letters on distant positions in a
much lower possibility. For example, it is more likely for the
keyword “listen” to be misspelled to be “lisetn” than “lestin”.
Hence, if u is set too larger, it may sacrifice the accuracy under
most occasions to conform some rare extreme cases.
To compare time efficiency in fuzzy search, we set two
groups of experiments, one for spelling typos and the other for
anagrams. For misspelling, each query consists of Lenquery
keywords , and we select m keywords in the query. The
selected keywords become mutants by three types of letter
operation on a single letter: 1) letter replacement 2) neighbor-
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Fig. 10: Search accuracy under different value of s and u (=
dmax/26) for infection
ing letters exchange and 3) deletion or addition a letter. For
example, the mutants of the word “search” in three cases re-
spectively could be “seerch”, “saerch” and “serch”/“searrch”.
With the keyword mutant involved in queries, we imitate the
real fuzzy search scenes in practice. The experiment result is
reported in Figure 11.
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Fig. 11: Influence of misspellings on accuracy
Another interesting case in fuzzy search is when ana-
grams are involved in queries and files. As explained already,
anagrams make many currently popular search schemes on
encrypted data invalid. To evaluate the scheme performance
with anagrams involved, we collect in a total of 500 pairs
of anagrams from [44], and then insert NA anagrams into
files and queries in pair. Anagrams are inserted into FA
files. NA and FA are adjusted separately in two groups of
experiments for variable control. Results of experiments are
reported respectively in Fig 12 and in Fig 13.
Through these two groups of experiments, our scheme
outperforms the scheme based on traditional ’uni-gram’ more
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(NA) on accuracy
than for non-fuzzy search. We believe such improvement of
accuracy obviously results from our proposed new mechanism
to transform keywords in text to OPU.
D. Time efficiency
At last, we compare the search time consumption with HIT
adopted and without it. From theoretical analysis, the time
complexity is reduced from O(n) to O(logn) and experiment
result in Fig 14 conforms to the analysis well. Besides,
comparing the result with previous experiments, we find HIT
brings very slight harm to accuracy, which is acceptable in
most practical occasions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel scheme for multi-keyword
search over outsource encrypted data, where a fuzzy search is
well supported in many different cases. Innovative proposal in
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Fig. 14: Influence of the use of HIT on search time
the paper does no harm to the privacy guarantee on outsourced
data.
Our contributions can be concluded into two aspects:
1) we propose a novel keyword decomposing scheme based
on what is named “order-preserved uni-gram” (OPU),
which eliminates many weaknesses of previous “uni-
gram” and “n-gram” schemes.
2) we design a novel file indexing tree (HIT) which is
based on hierarchical cluster tree while we improve the
traditional K-means algorithm for data clustering. Thanks
to the novel dynamic K-means algorithm, the indexing
tree can be constructed more flexibleand with fewer
parameters set manually.
Experiments on real-world data prove the effectiveness of
our proposed architecture. OPU brings accuracy improvement
to a great extent under various experiment settings, and the
proposed HIT increases search time efficiency without obvious
hurt on search accuracy,
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